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Abstract 
To improve the poor’s access to healthcare services, the 
Indonesian government introduced Askeskin, a subsidized 
social health insurance for the poor. We examine the effects 
of this social health insurance on women’s use of 
healthcare—maternal, preventive, and curative healthcare—
services. Using propensity- score- and difference-in-
differences matching strategies, we find the insurance 
increases the use of public facilities for maternal healthcare, 
discourages the use of midwives’ services, and increases the 
use of contraception; it does not seem to increase the use of 
preventive and curative care, however.  
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Introduction 
Poor health may keep the poor trapped in poverty. More than one billion of the 
world’s poor cannot afford healthcare services; each year, catastrophic health 
payments (direct outlays of cash) force 100 million people into poverty 
(WHO, 2010). In Kenya and South Africa, for example, out-of-pocket health 
payments drive 100 and 290 thousand households, respectively, below the 
poverty line each year (ILO, 2008a). In Indonesia, the country we study in this 
paper, out-of pocket-payments of one in two people in the poorest quintile are 
catastrophic (Sparrow et al., 2012). 
Poor health may lead to poverty because poor households cannot 
smooth their consumption when they face adverse income shocks (Baland and 
Robinson, 2000; Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Jensen 2000). To pay for 
healthcare services, the poor may have to sell their household assets, or pull 
their children out of school and send them to work; the poor may also have to 
stop working to support ailing household members. Moreover, healthcare 
services are expensive, which prevents many of the poor from using them and, 
in turn, prolongs their ill-health. In Indonesia, for example, because many 
people cannot afford healthcare services, out-of-pocket health payments are 
less than two percent of total household spending on average (Sparrow et al., 
2012).  
These expensive healthcare services hit women in developing countries 
hard. For example, women have higher risks of malnutrition, exposure to 
chronic diseases, and mortality rates during health emergencies because they 
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lack, among others, education and access to resources such as land and savings 
(United Nations, 2009), which are worsened by gender attitudes that relegate 
women to second-class status. (In most patriarchal societies, men control 
household resources and expenditure.) Women in developing countries may 
not have a say on their own health matters: In Burkina Faso and Nepal, for 
example, 75 and 51 percent women, respectively, say that their husbands alone 
decide their health needs (United Nations, 2009). 
Women’s reproductive health, in particular, is vulnerable to high 
healthcare costs. Medicines, contraceptives, transportation costs, and user fees 
for advanced procedures can so expensive so that it may push some women 
and their households into poverty (UN, 2009). Moreover, men (who make 
most of household decisions) may be reluctant to use household resources on 
women’s healthcare needs, which causes women to underuse healthcare 
services. In Indonesia, for example, 53 percent of women give birth at home 
and only one in ten give birth at public hospitals or health centers (IDHS, 
2007), which leads to high mortality rates (because these women receive 
inadequate treatment and care). Indonesia’s maternal mortality ratio in 2010 
was 210 deaths per 100,000 live births—higher than the figures in its 
Southeast Asian neighboring countries (World Bank, 2015).  
To improve the poor’s access to healthcare services, the government of 
Indonesia introduced Askeskin, a subsidized social health insurance for 
Indonesia’s informal sector in 2005  (ILO, 2008b), which covered about 76.4 
million people in 2007. Askeskin covered outpatient care at public hospitals 
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and health centers, which include women’s healthcare services such as 
obstetric services, immunizations, and contraceptive treatments; it also had 
mobile health services and special services for remote areas.  
In this paper, we examine the effects of Askeskin on how women use 
maternal, preventive, and curative healthcare services. We use propensity 
score matching and generalized difference-in-differences matching strategies 
to control for unobserved time-invariant determinants of healthcare use. We 
find that Askeskin induces women to have birth deliveries and antenatal 
checkups at public facilities, discourages them from getting help from 
midwives, and makes them more likely to use contraceptives. We also find 
some evidence that Askeskin increases, not decreases, delivery care 
expenditure, particularly the expenditure of women in rural areas. We do not 
find evidence that Askeskin increases women’s preventive and curative 
healthcare use, however.  
We contribute to the literature in three ways. One, we provide some 
evidence of the effects of a social health insurance on maternal and women’s 
preventive and curative care use, which complements papers in the literature 
that examine the effects of social health insurance on general healthcare use.
1
 
                                                          
1
 Some of the papers that examine the effects of social health insurance are in the US, 
China, Vietnam, Colombia, West Africa, and Thailand  (Baicker et al. (2013); 
Wagstaff et al., (2009); Wagstaff (2010); Miller et al., (2013); Smith and Sulzbach 
(2008); and Liabsuetrakul and Oumudee (2011). We are not aware of papers that 
examine the effects Askeskin on maternal and women’s preventive and curative 
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Two, we analyze Indonesia, a middle-income country, whose social and 
cultural environments differ from those of other developing countries and the 
effects of social health insurance on women’s healthcare use may, therefore, 
also differ. Three, unlike some papers in the literature, we control for supply 
side characteristics of maternal healthcare services in our estimations, which 
we hope makes our estimates of the effects of the social health insurance more 
likely to be unbiased.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the social 
health insurance and healthcare service providers in Indonesia. Then we 
describe the empirical strategy and data, and discuss the results and 
extensions. The last section concludes.  
 
 
Social health insurance in Indonesia 
Few Indonesians had social health insurance in the early 2000s—only one in 
ten before 2005 (ILO, 2008b). At the time, Indonesia had two health insurance 
schemes for the formal sector—Askes (health insurance for civil servants) and 
Jamsostek (health insurance for private sector employees)—but, health 
insurance for the informal sector was limited (ILO, 2008b).  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
healthcare use. Sparrow et al. (2012) examines the effects of Askeskin, but on general 
healthcare use only. 
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Kartu Sehat 
The 1997 financial crisis shrank Indonesia’s economy by fifteen percent in 
1998 and increased poverty rates by eight percent (Somanathan, 2008). It also 
reduced household’s utilization of healthcare services and healthcare 
expenditure: Outpatient utilization rates dropped from 0.193 visits per month 
in 1997 to 0.142 in 1998. Lacks of funds and drugs also lowered the quality of 
public healthcare, disrupted services, and lowered utilization rates 
(Frankenberg et al., 1999; Sparrow et al., 2008).  
To improve social protection for the poor, as part of social safety net 
programs, the Indonesian government introduced Kartu Sehat in 1998, 
financed by the government and the Asian Development Bank (Pradhan et al., 
2007).
2
 The most vulnerable households in each community were identified 
based on a set of poverty indicators developed by the national family planning 
board (BKKBN). Each eligible household was then issued a health card by 
village- and municipality-level committees. The card entitled the owner and 
his or her family members to a full fee waiver at public healthcare providers 
(private sector providers were not included in the program). Health facilities 
that offered free healthcare services received funds from the government to 
compensate their expenses (Pradhan et al., 2007; Somanathan, 2008; Johar, 
2009). 
                                                          
2
 Kartu Sehat literally means Health Card. It existed before the 1997 crisis, but its 
coverage and use were negligible.  
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The program had several problems. One, the allocated budget for 
compensation depended on the number of health cards that were distributed by 
regional governments, not the actual use of the health card, which caused an 
arbitrary relationship between Kartu Sehat use and service providers’ 
compensation (Pradhan et al., 2007). Two, the program was decentralized in 
which district administrators, village officials, and public health providers 
distributed the health cards. Targeting, therefore, relied on local knowledge 
where community members and local health officials defined eligibility 
criteria according to their own judgment, which caused an uneven distribution 
of funds across communities (Pradhan et al., 2007; Sparrow, 2008). Three, the 
criteria used by BKKBN to measure household income might not 
appropriately capture the effects of the economic crisis on the poor (Sparrow, 
2008).  
 
Askeskin 
The government discontinued Kartu Sehat in 2004 and replaced it with 
Askeskin in 2005, a social health insurance scheme for workers in the informal 
sector who had no access to formal insurance.
 3
 The government targeted 36.1 
million people in the first phase of its implementation from January to May 
2005; in the second phase from June to December 2005, the government 
increased the target to 60 million. By mid-2007, the program covered about 
                                                          
3
 Askeskin stands for Asuransi Kesehatan untuk Masyarakat Miskin, which means 
Health Insurance for the Poor. 
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76.4 million people. Askeskin covered free outpatient primary care in local 
health centers and sub-centers and free treatment at third class public 
hospitals. It included women’s healthcare services such as an obstetric 
package, immunization program, mobile health services, special services for 
remote areas, and medicines. Only a third of the private healthcare providers 
accepted Askeskin insurance, however (ILO, 2008b; Sparrow et al., 2012). 
The government fully subsidized Askeskin premiums: Monthly premiums per 
member were set at Rp 5000 (about US$ 0.55 in 2005 dollars) and the 
allocated annual budget for 2005 was about Rp 3.9 trillion (about US$ 40 
million). Askeskin was managed by Askes, a state-owned health insurance 
provider. Askes distributed health cards to Askeskin recipients and the 
government paid the premiums on behalf of insurance recipients. Askes then 
reimbursed hospitals and health centers for services they provided to card 
holders. Therefore, unlike Kartu Sehat, Askeskin was directly linked to 
utilization. 
Askeskin also had several problems. One, although Askeskin offered 
individual coverage, the targeting was done at household level (if a household 
was selected as a recipient, each member of the household received a card). 
Two, travel distance and costs in Indonesia remain barriers to healthcare 
utilization, which caused some members of recipient households to refuse it 
(Arifanto et al., 2005).
4
 Three, many people believed that Askeskin covered 
                                                          
4
 Recipients also had to pay the costs of printing their photographs on the health 
cards, which discouraged some people from accepting Askeskin. 
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low quality healthcare services; some did not even believe they would receive 
healthcare services for free (ILO, 2008b). Four, Askeskin had uneven 
distribution across regions in Indonesia like that of Kartu Sehat (ILO, 2008b). 
Five, delays in Askeskin coverage complicated its implementation because the 
government initially allowed Askeskin recipients to use the previously 
introduced Kartu Sehat to claim Askeskin benefits (Arifianto et al, 2005; 
Ministry of Health, 2005).
5
   
 
 
Empirical strategy and data 
Empirical strategy 
We use matching strategies to examine the effects of Askeskin on women’s 
healthcare use. We want to compare the use of healthcare services of Askeskin 
recipients and their use had they not been recipients, but because the allocation 
of Askeskin was not random, a comparison of women with and without 
Askeskin would provide biased estimates. Therefore, we match Askeskin 
recipients with non-recipients using the government’s eligibility criteria for 
Askeskin recipients. Then, we compare recipients’ with non-recipients’ 
utilization rates to get an unbiased estimate of the effects of Askeskin. 
                                                          
5
 The government also initially allowed the use of surat miskin, a letter written by a 
village head that states that somebody is poor, to claim Askeskin benefits. 
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We do the matching as follows.
6
 Using a probit model, we estimate 
each individual’s propensity score, the probability of being an Askeskin 
recipient as a function of his or her observed characteristics X, i.e., 𝑃(𝑿) =
Pr⁡(𝐷 = 1|𝑿) where D equals one if an individual is an Askeskin recipient and 
zero otherwise. (The observed characteristics include the criteria used by the 
government to select Askeskin recipients.) To ensure high quality matches, we 
use observations in the common support only (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 
1977)—we drop Askeskin recipients whose propensity scores are higher than 
the maximum or less than the minimum of the propensity scores of non-
recipients. Then, we match each Askeskin recipient with non-recipients whose 
observed characteristics are similar using the propensity scores (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983).
7
 To make sure that the matched samples are comparable, we 
use a specification in which observed characteristics between the recipients 
and non-recipients are balanced. Finally, we compare utilization rates of 
Askeskin recipients and non-recipients to get the estimates of the effects of 
Askeskin on women’s healthcare use, ?̂?, as follows: 
 ?̂? =
1
𝑁𝑇
[∑ 𝑌𝑖
𝑇 −𝑖∈𝑇 ∑ 𝜔(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑌𝑗
𝐶
𝑗∈𝐶 ] (1) 
where set T includes Askeskin recipients, set C includes non-recipients, 𝑁𝑇 is 
the number of Askeskin recipients, 𝑌𝑖
𝑇 and 𝑌𝑗
𝐶  are recipients’ and non-
recipients’ outcomes, respectively, and 𝜔(𝑖, 𝑗) is the weight we use to 
                                                          
6
 We use PSMATCH2 in Stata to do the matching. 
7
  Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that, under some assumptions, matching on 
P(X) is as good as matching on X. 
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calculate the average of non-recipients’ outcomes, which is a function of the 
propensity scores.
8
 
Because unobserved latent health status and individual health-
preferences may also affect whether an individual an Askeskin recipient and 
her healthcare use, which may make the estimates in equation (1) biased, we 
also use difference-in-differences (DD) matching estimators as follows:  
 𝛼𝐷?̂? =
1
𝑁𝑇
[∑ (𝑌𝑖2
𝑇 − 𝑌𝑖1
𝑇) −𝑖∈𝑇 ∑ 𝜔(𝑖, 𝑗)(𝑌𝑗2
𝐶 − 𝑌𝑗1
𝐶)𝑗∈𝐶 ] (2) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑇 and 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐶  are outcomes for Askeskin recipients and non-recipients, 
respectively, at time 𝑡 = {1,2}. Using this empirical strategy, therefore, we 
control for observed- and unobserved time-invariant determinants of 
healthcare use. 
 
Data 
We use the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), a longitudinal survey of a 
representative sample of the Indonesian population done by the RAND 
Corporation.
9
 To ensure that we use only past characteristics as covariates, we 
get pre-treatment characteristics from, IFLS-3, the third wave of the survey, 
which was done in 2000 (i.e., before Askeskin was introduced). We get 
outcome variables from, IFLS-4, the fourth wave of the survey, which was 
done in 2007 (i.e., after Askeskin was introduced).  
                                                          
8
 We use kernel matching, Epanechnikov kernel with a 0.06 bandwidth. 
9
 See Strauss et al. (2009) for a description of the survey. 
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To estimate the effects of Askeskin on maternal healthcare use, we 
include a sample of ever-married women between the ages of 15 and 45; for 
preventive and curative care, we include all adult women older than 15. For 
the maternal healthcare use, the sample sizes range from 1,200 to 5,000, which 
depend on the measure of outcomes we use. The sample sizes for preventive 
care are about 6,000; for curative care, they are about 3,500.  
We define Askeskin, the treatment variable, as an indicator equals one 
if a woman was an Askeskin recipient in the year 2005 and zero otherwise. 
Because the eligibility criteria used by the government in later years might 
differ, to get good matches, we exclude women who received Askeskin for the 
first time in 2006 or later. 
We use four measures of maternal healthcare utilization: place for 
delivery, place for antenatal check-up, contraceptive use, and delivery care 
expenses. For place for delivery and antenatal checkup, we use two measures: 
public facility, an indicator equals one if a woman used a public hospital or 
community health centre/sub health centers and zero otherwise, and village 
midwife, an indicator equals one if a woman got help from village midwife and 
zero otherwise.
10
 Contraceptive use is an indicator equals one if a woman was 
using any form of contraception to prevent a pregnancy at the time of 
interview. Delivery care expenses is the logarithm of the rupiah value spent on 
healthcare during child delivery.  
                                                          
10
 Health centers include community health clinics (puskesmas), sub-community 
health clinic (posyandu), delivery hospital, and village delivery post (polindes). 
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We include three and five measures of preventive and curative care, 
respectively. Preventive care measures include whether a woman received a 
checkup for blood pressure, cholesterol, or blood sugar. Curative care 
measures include whether a woman who was previously diagnosed with 
hypertension, arthritis, diabetes, asthma, or cancer is currently taking 
medication to manage the condition. All are dummy variables. 
For specifications in which we use place for delivery, place for 
antenatal check-up, and delivery expenditure as measures of outcome, we limit 
the sample to women who experienced a pregnancy during the years 2006-
2007/08. Similarly, in specifications in which we use preventive care use as 
measures of outcomes, we limit the sample to women who received a medical 
check-up during the years 2006-2007/08.  
Covariates we use to match Askeskin recipients with non-recipients are 
the eligibility criteria that the village- or community-level committees used to 
identify Askeskin recipients (ILO, 2008b). They are socio-demographic 
characteristics of the head of the household (sex, employment status, 
education, and religion of household head); household composition (total 
number of household members, number of children than are less than five 
years old, and number of children more than five years old); housing 
characteristics (whether the house is self owned, whether a household has 
electricity, whether a household has piped water for drinking, availability of 
toilet facilities, materials house floor is made of); and asset ownership that 
14 
 
indicate a household’s socio economic status (ownership of a refrigerator, 
electric or gas stove, and television).  
We also include other household characteristics to make sure that the 
treated- and control group are comparable. We include three indicators on 
whether the households ever utilized a village poverty letter, whether they 
previously owned a health card, and whether they ever received assistance in 
the form of food or other goods by governments or non-government 
organizations.
11
 We also include variables that measure the households’ 
familiarity with health care facilities. (This knowledge is important because it 
captures unobserved effects of social networks on health care demand. 
According to Weerdt and Dercon (2006), social networks help households and 
individuals locate health care providers by sharing referrals.) IFLS-3 has 
questions on whether household heads have any knowledge of where the 
nearest public and private hospitals and healthcare centers are located. 
Inclusion of these variables will reduce omitted variable problems associated 
with social networks, a factor that is hard to quantify (Johar, 2009). In 
specifications that measure maternal healthcare utilization, we also include 
community-level supply side variables that measure the availability and 
quality of maternal healthcare services: whether a community has a midwife, 
delivery posts, or monthly weighing posts; the number of family planning 
                                                          
11
 The former variable indicates a household’s poverty status and increases a 
household’s probability to receive Askeskin.  
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posts in a community; and the number of beds in the community delivery post. 
We also include a set of provincial dummies to control province-specific 
observed- and unobserved characteristics that may affect Askeskin eligibility.  
Table 1, which presents the summary statistics, shows Askeskin 
recipients are more likely to use public facilities and less likely to use 
midwives for both birth delivery and antenatal check-up; are more likely to 
use contraceptives; have lower delivery care costs; and are less likely to use 
services for preventive care. On curative care use, Askeskin recipients and 
non-recipients do not seem to differ much, however. 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
The characteristics of Askeskin recipients and non-recipients seem to 
differ, which is unsurprising because Askeskin was targeted to the poor. About 
58 percent of women in the treated group were headed by females compared 
to 53 percent in the control group; the mean number of years of education of 
household heads is about two years less in the treatment group; and the 
household head in the treated group is more likely to be Muslim. The 
employment statuses of the household head do not seem to differ, however.  
The composition of households in the control and treated groups does 
not seem to differ. The average number of household members, number of 
children less than five years of age, and number of children older than five 
years of age is about six, one, and one, respectively for both groups.  
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Askeskin recipients are more likely to live in rural areas and are less 
likely to live in high quality housing. They are about 7, 20, 34, and 18 
percentage points less likely to have electricity, piped water for drinking, own 
toilet facilities and tiled flooring, respectively. Similarly, they are about 
sixteen percentage points more likely to live in homes with dirt floors, 
indicating sub-standard housing.  
The Askeskin recipients are poor as their socio-economic status and 
knowledge of health planning facilities show. They own fewer household 
appliances: They are about 19, 9 and 21 percentage points less likely to own a 
refrigerator, electric or gas stove, and television, respectively. Askeskin 
recipients are also more likely to have received a letter for poor and 
government assistance, and previously owned a health card. They are more 
likely to be in households whose heads do now know much about family 
planning services.  
 
 
Results 
Basic results 
Panel A of Table 2, which presents the estimates of the effects of Askeskin on 
the place for birth deliveries, shows Askeskin encourages women to use public 
health facilities and discourages them from seeking help from midwives. 
Askeskin increases the use of public facilities by seventeen percentage points, 
which equals an 85 percent increase given that the baseline rate is twenty 
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percent (the matching estimate in column 1); after we control for time-
invariant unobservable characteristics using kernel DID (column 2), the  
estimate is similar: twenty percentage points or about 98 percent. Askeskin 
also reduces the use of midwives, by twenty percentage points or 65 percent as 
the matching estimate in column 1 indicates, which is similar to the estimate 
using DID matching in column 2: fifteen percentage points or 48 percent. 
These estimates are economically large; they are also statistically significant. 
Panel B, which presents the results for antenatal check-up, are similar: 
Askeskin makes women more likely to use public facilities and less likely to 
use midwives’ services. The matching estimate for public health facility in 
columns 1 is about 25 percentage points (89 percent); the kernel DID estimate 
in column 2 is also large, sixteen percentage points (57 percent). As women 
become more likely to use public facilities for antenatal check-up, they move 
away from midwives’ services: The effects are negative and economically 
large, 8-14 percentage points, though the matching estimate (column 1) is 
significant only at ten percent level while the kernel DID estimate (column 2) 
is statistically insignificant.  
Panel C shows Askeskin improves women’s contraceptive use. The 
estimates in columns 1-2 are similar, about seven percentage points or twelve 
percent. They are statistically significant at the five percent level.   
Panel D shows Askeskin increases, not decreases, healthcare expenses 
by 48 percent, at least when we use the kernel DID matching estimate, though 
the estimate is statistically significant only at the ten percent level. Askeskin 
18 
 
reduces delivery care expenditure by 48 percent, however, when we use the 
matching estimate in column 1. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
Table 3, which presents the matching estimates of the effects of 
Askeskin on preventive and curative care, does not show Askeskin matters. All 
estimates are economically small, most are less than one percentage point; 
they are also statistically insignificant (with standard errors larger than the 
estimates) except the effects of Askeskin on whether the women checked their 
blood sugar. We should cautiously interpret these estimates, however, because 
we do not control for time-invariant unobservable factors (IFLS-3 has no 
information on preventive- and curative care use). 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
The effect of Askeskin by sub-sample  
We now discuss the results by sub-sample: by the location of the women 
(urban vs. rural areas) and their age group (15-45 years old and older than 45). 
Table 4 shows that the signs of the estimates in the basic results are 
robust by urban or rural area, but we find the estimates of the effects of 
Askeskin are statistically significant for the birth delivery and antenatal check-
ups in urban areas and they are significant for contraceptive use and 
expenditure in rural areas. Askeskin increases the use of public health facilities 
in urban areas by about 30 percentage points (column 4); it does it in rural 
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areas, but the estimates are statistically insignificant (column 2). Askeskin 
reduces the use of midwife’s services, though the estimates are statistically 
insignificant (the estimate of the effect of Askeskin on the use of midwife’s 
services for antenatal check-ups is marginally significant). Askeskin increases 
contraceptive use in rural areas by nine percentage points; it does so in urban 
areas but the estimates are statistically insignificant. Askeskin increases health 
expenses in rural areas by 80 percent; it lowers them in urban areas though the 
kernel DID estimate is statistically insignificant. We should cautiously 
interpret the statistical insignificance of these estimates, however, because we 
may lack the statistical power to reject the null hypotheses in some 
specifications (when the sample size is only 500).  
<Insert Table 4 here> 
Table 5 also shows that the signs of estimates in the basic results are 
robust by age group, but we find the estimates of the effects of Askeskin are 
statistically significant for some measures of outcomes of older women, those 
who are 45 years old or older. Some estimates are statistically insignificant, 
though again they are possibly because of the lack of statistical power (the 
sample size may be as low as 436). 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
We also estimate the effects of Askeskin on preventive and curative 
care by the location of the women and their age group (like those in Table 3): 
Askeskin does not seem to improve the use of preventive and curative care. 
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The estimates are small, most are less than one percentage point; they are also 
statistically insignificant at the conventional level of significance. (We do not 
present the results for brevity.) 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
Askeskin, the social health insurance that the Government of Indonesia 
introduced to improve the poor’s access to healthcare services, increases the 
use of public facilities for maternal healthcare use, discourages the use of 
midwives services, and increases the use of contraception; but it does not seem 
to increase the use of preventive and curative care. These results are robust to 
where the women live (in rural or urban areas) and whether they are young or 
old, though the estimates are statistically insignificant in some specifications, 
probably because the sample size is small.  
Our findings agree with the literature on the effects of social health 
insurance on healthcare use in general. Wagstaff et al. (2009), for example, 
find subsidized health insurance in rural China increases outpatient and 
inpatient utilization; Smith and Sulzbach (2008) find community based health 
insurance increases the use of maternal care services in West Africa. Our 
results for preventive and curative care are also similar to the findings of 
Baicker et al. (2013) who do not find Medicaid improves the intake of 
medication for chronic conditions in the US.  
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These results suggest some policy implications. One, social health 
insurance, because it increases maternal healthcare use, may help to reduce 
maternal mortality in developing countries like Indonesia where most of 
maternal deaths occur just before, during, or after delivery (World Bank, 
2010). Much of these deaths can be prevented if, due to social health 
insurance, women have better access to emergency obstetric care. Two, social 
health insurance, through its effects on contraceptive use, also help to limit 
unwanted pregnancies, promote better family planning (and reduce the need 
for abortions), and lower the number of maternal deaths. Three, social health 
insurance is insufficient to promote preventive and curative care use; 
governments may also need to complement health insurance with educational 
programs that promote the use of preventive and curative care.  
To increase maternal healthcare use in rural areas, the government of 
Indonesia may also need to allow social health insurance to cover midwives’ 
services. Ensor et al. (2008), for example, show that village midwives in 
Indonesia are less likely to serve Askeskin recipients because its 
reimbursements are unreliable. (They get 60 percent of their earnings from 
private fees.) People in rural areas have to pay transportation costs when they 
visit public health facilities in cities, costs that some of them cannot afford 
(Johar, 2009). Instead, they could seek out help from village midwives if the 
insurance also covers midwives’ services. 
Askeskin seems to matter more for women who live in urban areas, 
which could be caused by non-existence of hospitals in rural areas and 
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socialization problems. Social health insurance helps the poor in rural areas 
only if they can afford transportation costs to nearby cities or the government 
expands the network of health clinics to rural areas; allowing social health 
insurance to cover midwives’ services would help too. (Most hospitals and 
clinics in Indonesia are in urban and semi-urban areas.) Promoting social 
health insurance through campaigns would help too because recipients may 
not know how insurance operates and what the benefits of the insurance are 
(ILO, 2008b).  
 It is unclear whether Askeskin provides its recipients financial 
protection from catastrophic payments: Askeskin may increase delivery care 
expenditure, particularly for women who live in rural areas.
12
 The matching 
estimates for delivery expenditure is negative and statistically significant, but 
the kernel DID is positive though statistically significant at the ten percent 
level; in fact, Askeskin increases delivery expenditure of women who live in 
rural areas. Evidence in the empirical literature on the effects of insurance on 
delivery costs is also mixed: Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008), for example, find 
insurance reduces cost of deliveries in China, but it does not the out of pocket 
spending; Wagstaff (2010) does not find insurance reduce the out of pocket 
spending in Vietnam. 
                                                          
12
 Askeskin and delivery care expenditure positively correlate because an increase in 
the use of more expensive care at hospitals, and the increase in other related costs 
such as transportation costs, which are not covered by Askeskin. 
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In this paper, we consider the effects of Askeskin during its first year of 
operation when it has various problems: confusion on rights and obligations of 
patients and service providers and a lack of understanding of how the program 
operates. Still we find social health insurance improve the use of maternal 
health care, which means that social health insurance that governments 
implement carefully would bring larger benefits for the poor or even improve 
the use of preventive and curative care (unlike our findings in this paper). 
These issues could perhaps be addressed in future research.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
          Means  
Variables Control 
(No Askeskin) 
Treatment 
 (Askeskin) 
All  
 
Outcome Variables 
   
 
A: Place for delivery: 
 
   
Public hospital or  health 
centre 
0.200 
(0.400) 
 
0.281 
(0.453) 
0.203 
(0.402) 
Village midwife 0.314 
(0.464) 
 
0.109 
(0.314) 
0.308 
(0.462) 
    
B: Place for antenatal 
check-up 
 
   
Public hospital or health 
centre 
0.280 
(0.449) 
 
0.565 
(0.499) 
0.287 
(0.452) 
Village midwife 0.504 
(0.544) 
 
0.377 
(0.517) 
0.501  
(0.543) 
 
 
C: Contraceptive use 
Using contraception 
 
 
 
0.585 
(0.492) 
 
 
 
0.641 
(0.480) 
 
 
 
0.587 
(0.492) 
 
D: Expenditure 
Delivery expenses (log) 
 
13.092 
(1.228) 
 
 
12.133 
(1.191) 
 
13.068 
(1.235) 
    
E: Preventive Care  
 
   
Checked blood pressure 
 
0.827 
(0.377) 
 
0.801 
(0.399) 
0.826 
(0.378) 
Checked cholesterol 
 
0.048 
(0.214) 
 
0.034 
(0.181) 
0.048 
(0.213) 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics  (continued)  
 
 
    Means  
Variables Control 
(No Askeskin) 
Treatment 
(Askeskin) 
All 
    
Checked blood sugar 
 
0.044 
(0.204) 
 
0.014 
(0.177) 
0.042 
(0.201) 
F: Curative Care    
 
Hypertension 
 
 
0.168 
(0.374) 
 
 
0.146 
(0.354) 
 
0.167 
(0.373) 
Arthritis 
 
0.103 
(0.304) 
 
0.068 
(0.252) 
0.101 
(0.301) 
Diabetes 
 
0.025 
(0.158) 
 
0.034 
(0.181) 
0.026 
(0.160) 
Asthma 
 
0.023 
(0.149) 
0.023 
(0.152) 
0.022 
(0.149) 
 
 
Cancer 
 
0.005 
(0.068) 
 
0.007 
(0.088) 
 
0.005 
(0.069) 
    
 
 
Household head’s 
characteristics  
 
   
Female head of household 0.529 
(0.499) 
 
0.575 
(0.495) 
0.543    
(.498)  
Education 6.419 
(4.175) 
 
4.441 
(3.259) 
6.420    
(4.454)            
Employment 0.767 
(0.422) 
 
0.773 
(0.418) 
0.726     
(0.445)           
Muslim head of household 0.894 
(0.306) 
0.947 
(0.223) 
0.874    
(0.331)           
    
    
    
32 
 
    
Table 1: Summary Statistics (continued)  (continued)    
 
 
    Means   
Variables Control 
(No Askeskin) 
Treatment 
(Askeskin) 
All 
    
Number of children less 
than five years old 
1.282 
(1.282) 
 
1.455 
(1.374) 
1.081    
(1.264)            
Number of children older 
than five years old 
1.182 
(1.463) 
0.931 
(1.242) 
1.172     
(1.489)           
    
Characteristics of house 
 
   
Urban location 0.465 
(0.498) 
 
0.312 
(0.464) 
0.498 
(0.500) 
House self owned 0.788 
(0.413) 
 
0.829 
(0.376) 
0.760  
(0.438)    
Has electricity 0.903 
(0.294) 
 
0.829 
(0.376) 
0.907 
(0.290)     
Has piped water for 
drinking 
0.551 
(0.497) 
 
0.349 
(0.477) 
0.564 
(0.495)                
Has own toilet facilities 0.650 
(0.476) 
 
0.331 
(0.471) 
0.657     
(0.474)           
Floor made of 
ceramic/tiles 
0.386 
(0.486) 
 
0.207 
(0.406) 
0.407  
(0.491)              
Dirt floor 0.119 
(0.324) 
0.278 
(0.449) 
0.118  
(0.322)              
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (continued)  (continued) 
 Means  
Variables Control 
(No Askeskin) 
Treatment 
(Askeskin) 
All 
    
Household asset 
ownership/socio 
economic status 
 
   
Owns Refrigerator 0.283 
(0.450) 
 
0.089 
(0.286) 
0.308   
 (0.461)            
Owns electric/gas stove 0.120 
(0.325) 
 
0.025 
(0.155) 
0.140 
(0.347)               
Owns television 0.614 
(0.486) 
 
0.359 
(0.480) 
0.593 
(0.491)               
Has letter for poor 0.051 
(0.221) 
 
0.099 
(0.299) 
0.051   
(0.221)             
Received government 
assistance  
0.035 
(0.184) 
 
0.046 
(0.210) 
0.036   
(0.188)             
Owned previous health 
card 
0.184 
(0.387) 
0.362 
(0.481) 
0.176    
(0.380)             
    
Knowledge of health care 
facilities 
 
   
Knows where nearest 
public hospital is located 
0.732 
(0.442) 
 
0.647 
(0.478) 
0.726     
(0.445)            
Knows where the nearest 
private hospital is located 
0.491 
(0.499) 
 
0.365 
(0.482) 
0.503   
(0.500)             
Knows where the nearest 
public clinic is located 
0.936 
(0.244) 
 
0.928 
(0.257) 
0.905     
(0.292)           
Knows where the nearest 
private clinic is located 
0.177 
(0.381) 
 
0.086 
(0.281) 
 
0.188 
(0.391)           
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (continued) 
   
 Means   
0.159 
(0.366)            
Variables Control 
(No Askeskin) 
Treatment 
(Askeskin) 
All 
    
No. of family planning 
posts 
0.744 
(3.646) 
 
0.522 
(1.535) 
0.967    
(4.169)            
No. of sub family planning 
posts 
3.651 
(16.369) 
4.273 
(17.179) 
5.041 
(19.862) 
    
No. of Posyandu 1.726 
(4.417) 
 
1.856 
(3.993) 
2.108 
(4.756) 
 
No. of beds at Polindes 
0.092 
(0.418) 
0.149 
(0.560) 
 
0.107   
(0.459)             
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  The number of 
observations of  women with no Askeskin is about 7000; those with Askeskin is 
about 400.  
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Table 2: The effect of Askeskin on maternal health care utilization  
Outcome ATT Kernel DID 
 (1) (2) 
 
A: Place for delivery 
 
  
Public facilities 
 
0.169** 
(0.074) 
0.197** 
(0.071) 
Village midwife  
 
-0.202*** 
(0.044) 
 
-0.153** 
(0.039) 
   
B: Place for antenatal 
check up 
 
  
Public facilities 
 
0.250*** 
(0.077) 
0.160** 
(0.074) 
Village  midwife 
 
-0.145* 
(0.082) 
-0.083 
(0.071) 
   
C: Contraceptive use    
 
Using contraception     
 
0.074** 
(0.034) 
 
0.072** 
(0.032) 
   
   
D: Delivery expenditure  
 
Expenses (log) 
 
 
-0.485** 
(0.239) 
 
 
0.419* 
(0.226) 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications are in parentheses. The 
number of observations in columns 1-2 is about 1130, 1400, 5300, 1100 in 
panels A-D respectively; in column 3 it is 3600, 3700, 6000 and 2550, 
respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3: The effect of Askeskin on preventive and curative care  
Outcome ATT 
 (1) 
 
A: Preventive care 
 
Checked blood pressure 
 
 
 
0.001 
(0.023) 
 
Checked cholesterol -0.008 
(0.011) 
 
Checked blood sugar -0.022** 
(0.007) 
 
  
B: Curative care -used medication for:  
 
Hypertension 
 
 
-0.017 
(0.023) 
 
Arthritis -0.017 
(0.016) 
 
Diabetes 0.009 
(0.011) 
 
Asthma 0.006 
(0.010) 
 
Cancer 0.009 
(0.007) 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications are in parentheses. The 
number of observations is 6200 and 3500 in Panels A and B, respectively. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: The effect of Askeskin on maternal healthcare utilization by location  
 ATT Kernel DID ATT Kernel DID 
 Rural Urban 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
A: Place for delivery 
 
    
Public facility 0.047 
(0.082) 
0.123 
(0.079) 
0.271* 
(0.139) 
0.313** 
(0.125) 
 
Village midwife 
 
-0.148** 
(0.072) 
 
-0.070 
(0.061) 
 
- 
 
- 
     
 
B: Place for antenatal checkup 
 
    
 
Public facility 
 
0.147* 
(0.102) 
 
0.094 
(0.095) 
 
0.339** 
(0.133) 
 
0.292** 
(0.120) 
 
Village  midwife 
 
-0.120 
(0.116) 
 
-0.022 
(0.093) 
 
-0.231** 
(0.125) 
 
 
-0.199* 
(0.107) 
     
C:Contraceptive use  
 
Using contraception 
 
 
 
 
0.083** 
(0.040) 
 
 
 
0.086** 
(0.039) 
 
 
 
0.087 
(0.063) 
 
 
 
 
0.031 
(0.059) 
     
D: Delivery expenditure  
 
Expenses (log) 
 
 
 
-0.077 
(0.311) 
 
 
0.810** 
(0.288) 
 
 
-1.072** 
(0.407) 
 
 
-0.299 
(0.364) 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications are in parentheses. The 
number of observations for the rural sample is about 620, 730, 3500 and 500 
in Panels A-D respectively; 500, 630, 2750, and 448 in Panels A-D, 
respectively in the urban sample. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: Effect of Askeskin on maternal health care utilization by age group 
Outcome ATT Kernel DID ATT Kernel DID 
 15-30 30-45 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
A: Place for delivery 
 
    
Public hospital or health centre 0.216* 
(0.123) 
0.180 
(0.110) 
0.068 
(0.115) 
0.135 
(0.098) 
 
Village midwife 
 
-0.125 
(0.102) 
 
-0.130 
(0.074) 
 
-0.145** 
(0.075) 
 
-0.141** 
(0.049) 
     
 
B: Place for antenatal checkup 
 
    
Public hospital or health centre 0.217* 
(0.128) 
0.132 
(0.115) 
0.309** 
(0.136) 
0.151 
(0.109) 
 
Village midwife 
 
-0.181 
(0.149) 
 
-0.071 
(0.110) 
 
-0.158 
(0.141) 
 
-0.026 
(0.107) 
     
     
C:Contraceptive use  
Using contraception  
 
0.057 
(0.071) 
 
0.061 
(0.068) 
 
0.070* 
(0.040) 
 
0.073* 
(0.039) 
 
     
D: Delivery expenses (log) 
 
-0.582 
(0.395) 
0.245 
(0.366) 
-0.665* 
(0.418) 
0.474 
(0.315) 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications are in parentheses. The 
number of observations for the younger sample is about 700, 880, 2000, 670 in 
Panels A-D respectively; and 500, 550, 3600, 436 for the older sample in 
Panels A-D, respectively.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
